ABSTRACT ▪ Much literature on European Works Councils (EWCs) is pessimistic, stressing their limited formal powers and the risks of isolation from broader mechanisms of worker solidarity and of 'capture' by management. This article questions such dismissive conclusions. EWCs must be studied as an element in a more general and complex process of regulatory innovation within the EU. Three specific developments create 'windows of opportunity' for a more optimistic scenario: the internal inconsistencies of managerial control, the new strategic importance of information flows, and the evolution of new bases for supranational trade union cooperation.
Introduction
The 1994 EU (European Union) directive on the establishment of European Works Councils (EWCs) has stimulated considerable research and debate. For some observers, it is a major contribution to workers' rights in multinational companies (MNCs). For others, on the contrary, it matches current trends in the management of MNCs and facilitates the creation of company-centred and management-driven industrial relations across Europe (Deppe, 1995) . Sceptics argue that European trade unions are limited in their ability to counter this development because of their 'structural inertia' (Stoop,1994) . The development of EWCs is consistent with decentralization in political and industrial relations systems and may assist MNCs in weakening their ties with national industrial relations systems (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991) . The predominant academic conclusion might seem that capital is the main beneficiary of EWCs; with trade unions and traditional industrial relations systems being considered the poor partners.
Our argument however is that EWCs are not simply the instruments of management and that in certain circumstances they do offer trade unions and worker representatives the opportunity to influence corporate decision-making. EWCs are one aspect of new complex interactions between supranational regulation and evolving international labour structures. The EWC initiative can be seen as a regulatory strategy to overcome some of the political and economic constraints facing the EU in the context of 'globalization'. We argue that developments in and around EWCs can have spin-off effects on the character of worker representation in Europe. These effects can condition management decisionmaking and organizational outcomes, implying a new form of 'joint regulation' in European industrial relations.
In this article we first discuss the shift in the pattern of regulation within the EU, and how and why new forms of regulation have emerged. We follow this with an account of how EWCs can be understood as one aspect of this form of regulation. We go on to analyse the tensions and limitations with this type of regulation and EWCs in particular. However, we also challenge the common notion that management can simply capture and control EWCs. The final section of the article suggests that we must understand the form of regulation and its context in order to appreciate whether or not it will be 'effective'. One of the main arguments presented here relates to how developments such as EWCs may be used and rearticulated, or 'captured', by labour in unintended ways. We argue that the context and uses of EWCs must be as central to the research agenda as their actual content.
The Search for New Forms of Regulation
EU economic and social policy emerged in a period of crisis for the Keynesian welfare state, and the model of corporatist intermediation associated with it. The principal orientation of EU intervention has been based on market integration and deregulation, exemplified by the Single European Market and Maastricht Treaty. Integration along market lines was embraced in order to contribute to the restructuring and unification of a 'European' capitalist base: the implicit assumption being that European capital possesses cultural and political characteristics that allow for a more organized and regionally committed capitalist constituency to emerge. There remains a political and economic question as to how the changing constituency of capital in Europe is to be, first, regulated and 'supported' in a more global and liberalized economic space, and second, wedded to the social character of traditional European regulation.
A major constraint for the EU is the political dimension. The nature of decision-making is such that on most issues the tendency is to seek a lowest common denominator. EU policy has rarely gravitated towards 'best practice' in the social regulation of the employment relationship:
instead it seeks a common reference point which inevitably, given the diversity of social regulation and welfare systems, tends to be a minimum standard.
Consequently an interest in alternative forms of regulation emerged to address economic and fiscal issues within the EU and problems of its decision-making processes. Within a complex and at times contradictory policy-making context, the responses have varied from direct forms of intervention based on strategic alliances between economic and industrial groups to more indirect support involving facilitating contacts between a range of economic actors and public bodies. For example, the EU scientific and academic exchange programmes are evidence of how networking is facilitated and organized within the European political space. The aim is to create a supportive framework within knowledge-based communities that consistently interact with the projects of the EU and the new actors involved in the process. This networking is crucial for understanding the way EU policy is made, implemented and developed. Policy implementation, like the decision-making described earlier, is based on a broader articulation and combination of actors (Jensen et al., 1999; Peters, 1994) .
Thus a new discourse of 'state intervention' has been progressively emerging within the EU. This new form of regulation can be labelled 'regulation from below' (Moody, 1997) , 'indirect regulation' (Majone, 1997: 265) or 'flexible regulation'. A major example of this type of regulation is to be seen in the regional dimension of EU policies. It is our contention that whilst being formally different from the EWC initiative the latter conforms to the same pattern.
The logic of this process is that the EU, as an emergent supranational quasi-state, bypasses the nation states and locks into the activity and new roles established within the local and regional states. It provides the local state with specific resources and economic supports in its relations with MNCs and capital more generally. Transnational networks between the key agents of local state systems are elaborated and supported by the EU, so that local economies may continue to prove attractive to international and European capital. New strategic alliances and loose neocorporatist arrangements that involve local economic interests at the micro level emerge to sustain this new role and 'symbiotic' relationship between state and capital (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 147-51) . This has been seen as a new logic of state intervention and support which has been characteristic of EU interaction with regional levels of regulation; it rests on the fact that global capital is still organizationally and environmentally dependent on local political, economic and social contexts (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Panitch, 1995; Peck, 1996) .
In parallel has been the emergence of legal and para-state regulation aimed at restricting and influencing the behaviour of economic agents. Majone (1994) has argued that traditional modes of governance have declined in significance because of external and internal pressures within the state, as discussed earlier. 'Accordingly, what is clearly evolving is a shift to forms of regulation based upon information and persuasion, rather than on command and control mechanisms; and . . . this needs to be acknowledged as part of the general reappraisal of the role of public policy in an increasingly complex and interdependent world' (Majone, 1997: 69) . A whole new range of institutions are being constructed, capable of monitoring and regulating the economy. What therefore seems to be emerging throughout various arenas of regulatory activity within the EU is a new logic of governance which underpins the attempts of the EU to locate itself in the new economic order. EU agencies enter the political arena as organizers and transmitters of information. Within such a set of relations, information becomes a political resource (Castells, 1998) .
There is thus an attempt within the EU to create new legal and political contexts through which other actors can participate in the regulation of capital.
Use of regulatory policy measures allows the European Commission to 'call the tune without paying the piper' in the field of social policy. Thus, by making use of regulatory policies in the area of social policy, rather than those involving direct Union expenditure, EU social policy, in a number of specific areas, sets the standards to be adhered to in member states while incurring minimal Union costs. (Cram, 1994: 210) In our opinion, EWCs clearly fit into the logic of regulation previously outlined. The EWC directive is a form of intervention into the corporate governance of MNCs. It clearly fits the logic of regulation outlined earlier: within the internal and external constraints of the EU political process, the directive creates new structures of regulation, in this case through worker representation in decision-making. It ties together distinct socio-economic constituencies, political elites and projects through an alternative mode of regulation (Jensen et al., 1999) . This is its strength but may also be its weakness, as we discuss in the next section.
The Limits of EWCs as a Form of Regulation
Indirect, flexible regulation may of course have its own limitations and problems. Majone (1994: 79) suggests how these new types of economic regulation contain weaknesses as well as strengths. The first main problem is that they can be 'captured' by the actors they are intended to control, becoming an extension of the very interests they were meant to regulate. Second, as with all organizational bodies they may be open to bureaucratic inertia and fail to connect with their original purpose; or their objectives may become vague and dysfunctional. Another problem is potential lack of coordination among the different regulatory actors and bodies. Finally, the very way such new forms of regulation have been developed may undermine their accountability and democratic status. Hence the new mechanisms may be transformed to function in ways unintended and unanticipated.
Such risks clearly exist in the case of EWCs. Relevant issues include: their possible isolation within a market-oriented EU; the uneven international dynamics of trade union politics; internal differences and tensions in social and gender terms; their unanticipated use as new forms of worker integration by management; and the impact of complex differences within national systems of regulation and actors. These five areas of concern are now discussed.
The first concern is the possible isolation of EWCs as regulatory institutions. The way that discussion and engagement develop in each EWC will invariably differ, and a move to a proactive social and employment orientation cannot be readily assumed. They may remain one of the few important institutional developments of the 'social dimension', isolated from other initiatives in terms of worker representation and rights.
It has been suggested that economic constraints and power imbalances also limit the capacity and influence of key agents (Mouzelis, 1995) . First of all, the economic context of different countries (along with the strategic position of employers and trade unions within them) will influence the internal politics of EWCs. Second, it is also clear that labour's international structures are still relatively limited when compared with those of transnational capital (Lecher, 1998; Platzer, 1998) . These factors may undermine the strategic linkages which could regulate international capital. As a consequence of the project of 'new regulation', governance structures may become institutionally 'stretched', constructed in a more precarious and complex manner, and articulated in broader spatial and organizational terrains, hence making regulatory processes and outcomes more complex and potentially no more than symbolic. 1 There will also be political and organizational tensions within the new structures of worker representation themselves. Many of these tensions will reflect national differences in worker representation and the role of informal worker networks. In internal terms, questions have been raised about the accountability of EWC representatives, their gender and ethnic profile and their political complexion (Meissner, 1994) . The agendas of such structures will be the subject of competing interests and interventions. In addition national interests will continue to be mobilized by employers, managers and worker representatives within this forum Martínez Lucio, 1997, 1998) .
The concern amongst certain commentators is that EWCs may undermine traditional arenas of national and sectoral regulation (Streeck, 1997) .
It is envisaged that employers can use, and capture, them as a vehicle for communicating business as opposed to social issues, and for constructing special relations within these arenas with certain labour representatives at the expense of others (Weston and Martínez Lucio, 1997) . EWCs may facilitate the development of 'enterprise egoism' within the European labour movement and within privileged, elite firms. Hyman (1994) has noted the ongoing lure of the market as the basis of union identity and the tensions this may create for traditional forms of class and social identity. EWCs may in certain cases reinforce a corporate identity within its union constituency, creating new cleavages within the labour movement (Deppe, 1995; Royle, 1999; Wills, 2000) .
A different concern is that EWCs do not build on any strong state tradition or organized and regulated system of industrial relations at European level (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 157) . If anything the tendency is towards greater decentralization in political and industrial relations terms (Keller, 1998) . Any articulation of industrial relations at the transnational level will occur within a context of privileged firms and be apolitical and voluntaristic in nature (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 158) . Thus EWCs are likely to undermine traditional, solidaristic forms of industrial relations as regulation becomes internalized within the firm and in effect captured by employers. Institutions such as EWCs could become effective and autonomous actors only with the support -which does not exist -of a strong state tradition and 'public power' (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991: 142) .
The New Context of Transnational Labour Representation
The above analysis implies that a precondition for effective labour influence through EWCs is the parallel development of stronger, traditional forms of regulation. However, we would argue that the 'age of corporatism' and 'stronger' forms of regulation depended on a range of social and political factors for success (Lash and Urry, 1987) . The role of labour in the 'golden age' rested on a range of proactive local institutions, political parties and networks. In this respect that which resides beyond the realm of public power must be considered (Gramsci, 1973) . State intervention does not occur within a social and economic vacuum. Much depends on the way public power locks into and is supported by what Clegg (1989) calls other 'circuits of power': the way different power mechanisms interface with, and support, each other. Consequently, political and regulatory articulation is a key to any understanding of the social dimension of the EU: new state systems and new systems of regulation presuppose new sets of relationships between different institutional processes and actors (Jessop, 1990) . 2
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This new mediation of interventionist processes, and hence modification of regulatory institutions through strategy, reminds us that political institutions in part rely on a circuit of power for their development and meaning. There is a relational element in the way institutions regulate; questions of complementary and cohesiveness are central to the form of regulation (Torfing, 1990) . Regulation is therefore organized through systems of governance based on strategic links between institutions and social actors; and this is increasingly the case given the external social and political factors outlined at the start of this article. In this respect the external role of the state and its interface with society are now key features of its 'interventions'. Such political calculations and institutional developments must therefore contribute to the development of EWCs.
The development of effective power relations and systems of regulation will also depend on a temporal dimension, the strategic importance of what Cram (1994) calls 'windows of opportunities' for the development of public intervention. The effectiveness of state involvement ultimately depends on how the balance of forces or social relations are configured at a specific moment of time. Such 'windows of opportunities' are overlooked in some of the key literature on EWCs. They consist of: (i) the areas of management structure which are less able to 'capture' EWCs; (ii) the evolution of 'new management strategies' which permit new forms of union intervention, and (iii) the development of new forms of transnational and national employee networking. 3 First, EWCs are emerging in the context of new managerial developments: benchmarking, exhaustive (although not always consistent) performance measurement techniques, and an obsession with 'communication' (Knudsen, 1995) . This has created greater transparency of production data, used increasingly to control the labour process (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992) . This form of managerialism is based on a system of power which is ironically 'localist' in its scope, regardless of its allegedly global character. Within this context of internal market dynamics, employee representation is supposedly reconstructed into productivity coalitions with local management (enterprise unionism) which will be sustained through competition with other units of production or service delivery through 'coercive comparisons' (Ferner and Edwards, 1995) . But can such practices be sustained? Information is becoming a major vehicle of transnational management control but at the same time it provides a new arena of engagement and a potential resource for transnational employee representatives. For example, internal benchmarking may be a powerful mechanism for diffusing best practices, but it can be met by various forms of resistance, from local management as well as from labour. Already we have empirical evidence to suggest that such challenges are being made by labour (Weston and Martínez Lucio, 1997) .
To argue that EWCs have no effect on management and that they will inevitably be incorporated into managerial agendas is to ignore the complex organizational processes within MNCs. Many commentators exaggerate the power resources and consistency of management strategy (Hyman, 1994) ; internal power systems within organizations are invariably incomplete and precarious (Ferner and Edwards, 1995) . As Storey (1985) points out, there are numerous axes of internal tensions: departmental or hierarchical divisions (Lowe, 1993) , professional identities (Armstrong, 1989) , national and local interests (Doz et al., 1981) . Along these fault lines within organizations, information flows and controls inevitably become the focus of disagreement, especially when the structures of companies are changing as a result of mergers, takeovers and organizational volatility.
At local level, gaps in management information systems are exposed by alternative information flows. Managers increasingly have access to comparative data within their company which derive not only from the corporate hierarchy but also from informal circuits (Paauwe and Dewe, 1995: 71) . One EWC case study found that local management was confronted by trade unionists who were clearly circulating data (gained from informal sources) that suggested that corporate performance measurement systems varied between plants and that local managers were set different targets in different areas. This in turn stimulated local management to renegotiate with corporate headquarters how their relative performance was to be measured (Weston and Martínez Lucio, 1997) . In the case of the conglomerate Tomkins and textile manufacturer Coats Viyella in the UK, these types of issues have begun to emerge within discussions among EWC union members. Consequently, the exposure of information gaps at lower levels of management -particularly in systems based on the strategic use of information and centralized authority relations -are forcing some companies to set up new systems of communication in order to placate local management demands.
The new managerial 'regime' must become problematic as a strategy in the face of new institutions that bridge the distinct sites of employment which are being played off against each other. EWCs may provide a forum and a point of reference for exchanges of information across different plants which the new managerial regime attempts to divide and rule. They are being constructed when such management strategies have intentionally increased employee representatives' interest in and awareness of the new management performance and productivity measurements (Weston and Martínez Lucio, 1997) . In companies such as Ford, the cross-referencing of data is bringing new types of union exchange, facilitated by new means of communication such as the internet. This process is probably most developed in manufacturing, but the development of detailed performance measurement systems in other sectors such as financial services and telecommunications (especially in call centres) has made this the subject of transnational union exchanges here also. The EWC directive, allowing the use of 'experts' by employee representatives, in some cases enables organized labour to exploit the new informational resources.
Reference must also be made to the dynamics of new and broader forms of transnational worker representation. This has so far received scant attention, owing to a fixation with collective bargaining and formal institutions of industrial relations (Enderwick, 1982 (Enderwick, , 1984 Hyman, 1989; Martínez Lucio and Weston, 1995) . As well as the formal institutional vehicles for the development of transnational relations, there are informal ones involving a whole range of informational and political circuits relating to the activities and management practices of MNCs. A good example is the development of a range of networks among trade unionists in GM Europe, who organized meetings throughout the 1990s and formulated and shared counter-strategies on issues such as team-working. EWCs are influenced by such broader structures of employee representation which have been evolving in recent times and contribute to the new types of information flow discussed earlier. There is now not only growing evidence of wage comparisons across the EU (Marginson, 2000; Walsh et al., 1995) ; EWC agreements have also begun to stimulate international comparisons in local collective bargaining within the enterprises (Fulton, 1995: 237; LRD, 1994) . 4 A key issue is therefore the underpinning of EWCs through alternative networks and relationships: there is evidence of such supports even in Royle's (1999) sober assessment of the McDonald's EWC, where the absence of a union infrastructure limited the effectiveness of the forum. In the case of Renault, the EWC helped unions coordinate a short international stoppage in 1997 in reaction to the closure of the Vilvoorde plant in Belgium, even though opposition was not ultimately successful. Moreover, the EWC became a forum for the development of an alternative viability plan for the plant and broader discussions and relations. The episode led to widespread recognition within the EU of the need for a stronger underpinning of EWCs through improved consultation and information rights (Rehfeldt, 1999) .
EWCs are also affected by the increasing presence of other actors and institutional forms within the EU, and the problem of 'isolation' and 'capture' can be contained by this evolving political dimension. EWCs are elements of an increasingly organized system of supranational interest intermediation, involving for example the ETUC and the European Industry Federations. At regional level the embryo of a more structured industrial relations system has also been steadily developing (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000) . 5 Within the EU institutions, the Commission's approach to the drafting and development of new regulations is based on a process of negotiation and interaction which becomes consolidated over time (Jensen et al., 1999: 127) . This 'elite based' interaction may provide a source of tension in terms of the politics of the labour movement, but it provides a series of support structures and decision-making processes. There is regularity in regulation. Hence the development of new forms of transnational worker representation interlocks with major developments in the behaviour and structures of labour and capital at the political level of the EU. This may generate more windows of opportunity for labour. For example, Knutsen (1997) sees prospects for the consolidation of 'Euro-corporatism', while Falkner (1996: 202) interprets the Maastricht Social Agreement as a demonstration of such a process, and suggests that through such initiatives as the working time directive such 'Euro-corporatism' may 'cascade' down to company and workplace level. We agree; but the 'links' between levels and within circuits of power require further investigation and analysis.
Conclusion
Increasingly, the EU has developed, and come to rely on, external forms of regulation for its own regulatory structures to operate. In this respect there is not so much a 'hollowing out of the state' as a more complex process of interaction and external dependency. This means that new modes of regulation will depend on developments beyond 'public power'. Much may depend on how other types of softer regulation (for example at regional level) and the constituent actors (such as supranational trade union organizations) are articulated with EWCs if 'capture' by capital is to be avoided. Consequently, a key issue is the development of further support in terms of legislation, transnational networks and political links; and the interface between this and traditional forms of political action. How will EWCs be enhanced and supported from the 'centre' if they are to perform the function of influencing management priorities and decision-making?
Methodologically, the study of EWCs needs to go beyond the content of agreements, their structures or their pattern of bargaining, no matter how important these issues are. The reality is that EWCs are shaped by the environing political and social context. The interconnections between different types of regulation, state support, political action and ideological projects will be crucial for the development of this new form of regulation. A broader remit in EWC research is not solely an academic issue but also a political one. If we are to understand the twin problems of EWC capture and isolation, we need to comprehend the strategic preconditions for effective counter-measures.
This article has suggested that there is a new dynamic of transnational worker representation emerging with repercussions for the regulation of the international division of labour and capitalist organizational structures. It may be embryonic, and based on loose articulations between different sites of regulation, but it is emerging nevertheless. Given the complex nature of their construction, how will these new models of regulation develop and sustain themselves? Will they be subsumed within distinct and pre-existing systems of worker involvement or will they stimulate a new era of international labour politics? Either way, the strategy of indirect and flexible regulation leads to a new set of issues within the relations between capital and labour within the EU. They illustrate the evolution of new forms of transnational employment and industrial regulation that must be studied in terms of their complex political development, structure and context.
NOTES
1 For example, one of the criticisms of EWCs is that they would be no more than a 'weekend in Paris' for the trade unionists involved. 2 We use the term articulation in a different way from Crouch, who writes of an articulated organization as 'one in which strong relations of interdependence bind different vertical levels, such that the actions of the centre are frequently predicated on securing the consent of lower levels and the autonomous action of lower levels is bounded by rules of delegation and scope for discretion ultimately controlled by successively higher levels ' (1993: 54-5) . Crouch points to this dimension within trade unions as being a key factor in countries with 'stable bargained corporatism'. We use this concept in a different way, drawing on the work of Stuart Hall as well as Laclau and Mouffe (1984) . According to Hall, 'articulation is thus the form of connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time' (Grossberg, 1996: 141) . 3 The following section draws from, and elaborates on, a contextual model for understanding the development and impact of EWCs which we have presented in a previous article. In this case, we locate the model within a discussion about 'flexible regulation'. 4 Such transnational exchanges of information between constituencies of employee representatives will not necessarily be 'solidaristic' and evenly organized between distinct groups. While groups of employee representatives from different countries may collaborate through information networks (formal and informal), the lack of consistency in such structures means that most of the time the employee representatives are isolated from each other, which has been the case in previous attempts noted by researchers in this field. Thus, employee representatives may 'free-ride' by utilizing information gathered from networking as a means to consolidate and strengthen their own local position. 5 Marin (1990) identifies as a central tendency within 'stable corporatist systems' that when groups engage in a mass of transactions and political exchanges over time they ultimately evolve a sense of mutual reciprocity and obligation. Jensen et al. (1999) appear to identify the embryo of such a process within the EU.
